Erdogan has once again posed a challenge for Turkey's Western allies.
On September 2, after attending the SCO summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, Turkish President Erdogan said that Ankara would consider upgrading its relationship with the SCO to full membership. He also emphasized that joining the SCO does not mean abandoning the West. Turkey pursues a “360-degree” foreign policy.
Interestingly, during the same press conference, Erdogan also mentioned another matter: Turkey is continuing to negotiate with the United States to reintegrate itself into the F-35 program.
In other words, Ankara currently hopes to join an Eurasian political security mechanism that includes China, Russia, and Iran. At the same time, it also wishes to regain one of the United States’ most sensitive fifth-generation fighter jets.
This is pushing Turkey’s “strategic balance” to a new limit in recent years.
Turkey was originally an important participant in the F-35 project. However, in 2019, it was excluded from the project due to its purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system. The United States provided a very clear reason for this decision: the S-400 could pose a threat to the stealth capabilities and technical security of the F-35 when deployed together. In 2020, the United States imposed sanctions on Turkey's defense industry under the 'Countering American Aggressors Act'.
This year, the situation has seen some softening. In June, U.S. Vice President Mike Pence confirmed that the Trump administration is exploring ways to grant Turkey access to F-35 aircraft. In July, Trump also sent positive signals about reconsidering the F-35 deal. Meanwhile, Turkey and Russia are still discussing how to handle the S-400 issue.
Therefore, Erdogan's proposal to officially join the SCO is much more sensitive now than it was a few years ago.
Strictly speaking, joining the SCO does not mean joining an 'Eastern version of NATO'. NATO has a Article 5 of collective defense, while the SCO does not have an automatic military obligation that 'an attack on one country is an attack on all members'. Therefore, from the perspective of treaty structure, Turkey having two identities may not directly lead to legal conflicts.
But political issues are much more troublesome than legal issues.
Once becoming a full member, Turkey will establish more institutionalized coordination mechanisms with countries such as China, Russia, and Iran in areas like security, counter-terrorism, and regional affairs. Turkey is also an old member of NATO since 1952. It controls the passage through the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, and has long been responsible for important military tasks on the southeastern flank of NATO.
This means that what NATO is really worried about may not be Turkey’s “withdrawal from the alliance”, but a situation that is more difficult to handle: a core ally who controls NATO’s military system and wants access to F-35 aircraft, while also increasingly integrating into another security cooperation network led by China and Russia.
And this is precisely how Erdou'an excels at diplomacy.
In the past few years, Turkey has shown that it is not willing to take a clear side between Russia and NATO: It can purchase Russian S-400 systems, and also provide drones to Ukraine. It can maintain trade relations with countries other than Russia, while continuing to carry out NATO missions. It can demand the United States to sell F-35 weapons, while at the same time expanding cooperation with China and the SCO.
Erdogan wants to create a Turkey that does not belong to any single faction, but can extract strategic benefits from multiple factions.
The problem is that this game has technical and safety constraints.
The United States may be willing to allow Turkey and Russia to do business together, to allow them to participate in the SCO summit, and even to accept Turkey as a full member. But the F-35 represents the highest level of military mutual trust.
Therefore, whether Turkey will eventually be able to regain the F-35 may actually serve as the clearest gauge of NATO's limits.
Erdogan wants to prove that Turkey can have both NATO and the G20.
Next, it is necessary to observe whether the United States is willing to believe that such a Turkey is still worthy of having F-35 aircraft.
