On June 5th, the United States Department of State announced in a statement issued on May 28th that the Brazilian criminal organizations ‘Primeiro Comando da Capital’ (PCC) and ‘Comando Vermelho’ (CV) have been officially designated as terrorist organizations.
Just one day before the statement was released, Flavio Bolsonaro, son of former Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro and also a presidential candidate, met with US Secretary of State Mike Rubio. He raised the long-standing demand of Brazil’s far-right parties: that the United States recognize these criminal organizations as terrorist organizations.
Over the past few decades, the United States has repeatedly interfered in the internal affairs of Latin American countries under the pretext of “counter-drug wars” and “counter-terrorism wars”. These terms are not only used to serve these purposes but also to target political opponents whose political and economic interests conflict with those of the U.S. government.
In addition to direct political implications, this determination will also lead to the creation of a complete legal and institutional framework, allowing Washington to further expand sanctions, financial monitoring, intelligence operations, and various forms of extraterritorial pressure. This would transform an issue that originally pertains to domestic public safety into a policy lever for intervening in other countries. This action is not isolated; it corresponds to the pressures that the United States have already exerted on Brazil’s sovereign payment system, Pix. The U.S. Trade Representative Office has initiated scrutiny of Pix, claiming that it damages the interests of domestic financial and payment companies.
Whether in the fields of public safety, financial systems, or digital infrastructure, the core issue is that Washington attempts to subdue Brazil's sovereign institutional capabilities under its national power and corporate monopolistic interests.
This move was not accidental. It occurred just before the crucial presidential elections in Brazil, with the first round of voting scheduled for October 4th. At the same time, the far-right presidential candidate Flavio Bolsonaro became involved in a corruption scheme involving Banco Master and its former controlling shareholder Daniel Walcara. This affected his campaign momentum, causing it to decline steadily.
Recent polls show that Flavio’s support rate is declining; moreover, in the first and second rounds of simulated voting, he has been trailing behind Lula. Meanwhile, there are various political maneuvers within Brazil’s right-wing faction, aiming to unite around another more traditional and moderate figure in order to challenge the current president.
On May 12, 2026, Brazilian Senator Flavio Bolsonaro arrived in the Brazilian capital Brasília to attend the swearing-in ceremony for the President of Brazil and the Vice President of the Supreme Electoral Court. During the ceremony, he made a phone call. Reuters
It is worth noting that last year, when the political operations of the Bosonaro family were in trouble, former President Jair Bolsonaro was officially disqualified from running for office. It was against this backdrop that Trump took the most aggressive measures against Brazil during his new term – the so-called “Tarifaço” policy, a package of punitive tariffs. The intention was to force the Lula government to intervene in the legal cases involving Jair Bolsonaro and to loosen the political restrictions imposed on him.
At that time, this measure contained at least two political intentions: on the one hand, to create friction between Lula and the Brazilian bourgeoisie affected by tariffs; on the other hand, to help the Bosonaro family gain an advantage in competition with some traditional right-wing forces. The latter hoped to retain the political assets associated with “Bosonaroism” while getting rid of the Bosonaro family itself.
These internal forces are supporting the current governor of São Paulo, Tarso de Freitas. He served as a minister in the Bosonaro administration and is seen as an ideal replacement: someone who can continue Bosonaro’s political agenda and take over after the former president loses his eligibility.
In such a situation, Federista BosoNaro’s brother, Congressman Eduardo BosoNaro, went to the United States to lobby Marco Rubio and the Trump administration, asking them to take measures to force Lula to lift the legal and political sanctions against his father.
Trump ultimately responded to this request with a "tariff strike." However, this action was not merely an attempt to pressure the Brazilian government. It essentially served as a public endorsement of the Bosonaro family and their candidacy, coming from the core supporters of the American far-right party. This endorsement strengthened the power of the Bosonaro family in their struggle against other right-wing factions within Brazil. Nevertheless, this strategy turned out to be counterproductive.
Lula successfully mobilized his social base to defend national sovereignty against tariff measures. In terms of relations with economic groups affected by tariffs, the government promoted exports while also taking a series of domestic compensation measures, thereby strengthening its ties with the business community.
The previously declining government support rate has suddenly seen increasingly positive data.
Meanwhile, political mobilization by unions, student movements, and the general public continues to intensify, thereby strengthening more advanced demands such as the abolition of the six-day workweek and the 44-hour workweek—which are historical demands that the Brazilian working class has long pushed for.
Therefore, the ‘tariff strike’ not only failed to weaken the Lula government, but instead gave Lula more strength, helping him to turn the unfavorable situation around. It also launched an important offensive in the struggle for workers’ rights.
After this conflict, Eduardo Bosonero was regarded as a "traitor," and even faced criticism from right-wing political forces involved in commercial interests.
Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the support given by the Trump administration to the Bosonaro family played a crucial role in preventing Tarso Siciliano from becoming the candidate who would replace their family.
Soon after, Jair Biesano Roré decided to put his son Flavio on the electoral list. This decision further confirmed the aforementioned strategy, and also indicated that his political efforts within Brazil’s far-right camp had been successful.
Trump's strategic failure against the Lula government was so severe that he had to partially withdraw his "tariff strikes," canceling tariffs on key Brazilian export products, and establishing a certain "coexistence model" with Lula. Trump began to publicly praise Lula, seeking a rapprochement, and even hosted him at the White House a few weeks ago.
However, anyone who believes that this easing of tensions means an actual retreat from the alliance between the US and Brazil’s far-right groups is wrong.
As Ernesto Che Guevara once warned: “Never trust imperialism, not even a little bit.”
Che Guevara, Argentine revolutionary, alongside Castro overthrew the dictatorship in Cuba. He later led guerrilla warfare in Bolivia. Captured and killed in 1967, he became a symbol of global left-wing movements and rebellious spirit.
There are only a few months left before the decisive electoral process. At this time, labeling the PCC and CV as terrorist organizations not only aims to help the struggling Flavio regain political dominance, but also creates a dangerous precedent for US intervention in Brazil's internal affairs.
In 1989, the United States launched the “Operation Just Cause” under the pretext of a “war on drugs,” military invading Panama and arresting President Manuel Noriega. Noriega had been a close ally of the United States in regional policy for a long time, but he was ruthlessly abandoned when his actions no longer served Washington's interests.
The “Plan Colombia” in 2000 was also carried out under the pretext of countering drugs, but in reality it served as a cover for the United States to fund and openly support security forces and paramilitary organizations. These forces carried out terrorist operations against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and peasant social movements in Colombia’s inland regions.
This framework also provided a fundamental reason for the United States to maintain military presence in Latin America and the Caribbean after the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the “red threat”.
More recently, the United States’ intervention in Venezuela and attempts to kidnap President Nicolás Maduro are also based on claims related to the “war against drugs” and “drug terrorism.” Washington relies heavily on unfounded accusations with clear political motives, such as claiming that Maduro led or was involved in the “Cartel de los Soles,” and labeling this organization as a terrorist group.
Similarly, during the early stages of his administration, Trump labeled Mexican drug cartels as terrorist organizations. In recent weeks, he has used similar arguments to threaten military intervention against Mexico, and even threatened to take action against Mexican government officials who are allegedly involved in drug politics.
In the latest National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy released by the United States, Washington openly advocates for weakening the sovereign ties between Latin American and Caribbean countries and extraterritorial powers. It is evident that the priority goal of the US current regional strategy is to undermine those progressive and left-wing governments that are most staunch in upholding national sovereignty and the principle of self-determination. These governments are precisely those that are most resolutely opposed to Washington’s attempts to obstruct or restrict the sovereign rights of any country to develop relations.
Since the US foreign policy under Trump has launched a comprehensive offensive against the left-wing governments in the region, far-right forces in Latin America have been growing stronger and are advancing their political goals across the continent through various alliances. The losses of progressive forces in countries like Ecuador, Chile, Bolivia, and Honduras are clear examples of this.
On the other hand, the electoral failures of the right in Uruguay, the resilience shown by the left in Colombia and Brazil on the eve of presidential elections, and the continued existence of the Chavismo government after Maduro’s attempt to be kidnapped, all highlight the limitations of the Trumpian strategy.
In recent weeks, massive protests have erupted in Bolivia, reflecting the growing dissatisfaction among the people and their search for a solution based on national sovereignty and social justice. Evo Morales, a leftist leader who was banned from running for office, has once again become a central figure in the country's political life.
On May 14, 2026, during a protest in La Paz, Bolivia, there was a conflict between artisanal miners and the police. The protesters demanded rights to access the expanded mining area. Associated Press
From this perspective, the United States' recent actions are similar to the previous failed 'tariff strike'. Their ultimate goal remains to pave the way for defeating Lula and the progressive forces in Brazil.
Looking back at 2008, it was under the leadership of Brazil and Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva that South American countries established the Southern Common Market Defense Council through the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). This marked the first time the region had a independent platform for defense consultation and cooperation. However, with the collapse of the progressive cycle later on, UNASUR and its Defense Council also collapsed, leaving the region without a mechanism to handle security and defense issues independently. This created a new vacuum that allowed the United States to impose its own agendas. Among these agendas, security and defense issues are often intertwined with the implicit protection of U.S. political and economic interests.
Therefore, defeating the coalition government led by Lula and the left-wing forces—even though this government has a moderate stance but remains an important pillar of regional autonomy, and plays a key role in South-South cooperation and the building of a multipolar world—has become a central component of Washington’s strategy. Brazil’s close coordination with China and its central role among the BRICS countries are clear evidence of this. Especially when another possibility is that a compliant and dependent government like Jair Bolsonaro could be re-elected, the motivation for the United States to promote this strategy becomes even stronger.
From the platforms of Trump's close allies such as Ecuadorian President Daniel Ponce de León and Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele, it is clear that Brazil's far-right parties' strategy in facing electoral competition is to place the fight against drug crime and the classification of criminal organizations as terrorist groups at the center of their political agendas.
After all, as Bolivia under Rodrigo Páez and Argentina under Millet's leadership have shown recently, policies that involve economic openness, political dependence, and a reduction of state functions do not bring benefits or hope to the majority of the population. The idea that strengthening the repression of violent groups can solve problems related to violence, poverty, and lack of development opportunities is merely a smokescreen. It not only covers up the political programs of Latin American right-wing surrenderism and elitism, but also hides their long-standing historical connections with drug trafficking organizations.
Moreover, America's hypocrisy regarding the Brazil issue is particularly evident.
Washington attempts to portray the necessity of containing PCC and CV as a so-called “American national security threat”. However, looking at the logistics routes for drugs from South America to the United States, the main route from the production centers in the Andes region to North America does not pass through Brazil, and these routes are not controlled by those organizations.
As Dario Durygan, the finance minister of the Lula government, pointed out in an interview: If the United States truly wants to target these organizations, it is crucial for the US and Brazil to strengthen cooperation and seize rifles, weapons, and synthetic drugs that are illegally flowing from the United States to Brazilian criminal groups on a large scale. Additionally, the United States should share information about the assets owned by these organizations in Delaware. Delaware has long been considered a tax haven, and it is precisely because it is difficult to track the assets of companies hidden there that many judicial investigations in Brazil have remained unresolved.
Lula responded firmly, publicly stating that Brazilians would not accept being treated like children. He called Flavio Bolsonaro a 'traitor' for advocating such actions in Washington. Lula also reiterated that the weapons used by drug dealers come from the United States, and Brazil is willing to combat organized crime—but it should begin with your state of Delaware, as those criminals launder their money there.
On the eve of the elections, Lula’s government has been pushing for a reform that would abolish the six-day working week and reduce Brazil’s 44-hour workweek to 40 hours. Recent surveys show that this measure has received support from over 70% of the population.
On the contrary, Flavio and his supporters not only oppose these progressive and popular reforms of civilization, but they also once again submit to the will and interests of Washington.
Looking back at January 2023, during the attempted coup, the Lula government stood firm under pressure and established a broad unity with democratic forces. Together, they resisted the expansion of neo-fascism led by Bosonaro supporters and supported by American far-right groups. This marked the beginning of a new cycle of social change.
When the 'tariff blow' struck, it was the people who took to the streets to defend Lula. It was the patriotism shown by those who refused to accept the coercion and extortion from the Trump administration that forced the United States to retreat, and continued to boost Lula's support rate.
Today, driven by the achievements of the working class’s victory and the patriotic spirit of the Brazilian people against foreign interference, Lula will face the threat from the United States once again. In the elections in October, he will be faced by a candidate who follows in his father’s footsteps, claiming to defend Brazil’s yellow-green flag, but who actually only bows to the American flag.
