On October 5th, the Moscow consultations on Afghanistan failed to produce a joint statement due to significant differences between Afghanistan and the United States regarding counter-terrorism issues. Three days ago, records from the U.S. Department of Justice showed that the Afghan Freedom Movement hired American lobbying firms to contact Congress members and officials from the State Department and the Treasury Department, in an attempt to influence U.S. policy towards Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, the number of anti-Taliban armed attacks verified by the United Nations has increased from 19 incidents from May to July last year to 55 incidents during the same period this year. Armed operations have become more active, exiled political forces are coordinating more closely, and security tensions in the surrounding areas have also intensified.
However, the Taliban's control over the country's major administrative and security institutions has not been shaken. The issue is not whether there are opposition forces, but whether they can transform their scattered military actions, domestic social support, and external resources into sustained political competitiveness.
In August 2021, after the Taliban regained power, Ahmad Massoud led the National Resistance Front, which relied on the Pajtun organization to resist. Losing their main strongholds, this front gradually shifted to ambushes, checkpoint attacks, and short-term operations, along with the Afghan Freedom Front. A report by the United Nations in September this year recorded that from May to July, 14 organizations claimed to have carried out 88 attacks across 21 provinces, with 55 of these incidents being confirmed. In July, a newly formed armed group briefly occupied local administrative buildings in Badakhshan Province before withdrawing. The expansion of the areas under attack does not mean that control over territories, residents, and transportation lines can be sustained.
Political coordination is also being advanced. In September, the National Resistance Front reorganized its military command staff; a conference on Afghanistan was held in Cambridge, UK, to discuss the establishment of a cross-organizational political platform. However, agreeing on common opposition to the Taliban is much easier than reaching consensus on future governance structures, ethnic and local power distribution, political transition, and the role of armed actions. The personnel changes remain within the framework of a single organization, and the coordination framework proposed at the conference cannot replace unified leadership.
In contrast, the Taliban not only controlled the country’s armed forces and financial resources, but also extended their religious authority, organizational discipline, and local relationships established during wartime to the cadre appointments and administrative systems. United Nations reports indicate that major decisions are made at the highest leadership level. This organizational continuity helps maintain control, but it does not mean that the Taliban achieved widespread political acceptance at the national level. There are still controversies regarding women’s education, public participation, and local interest representation, and social dissatisfaction will not automatically lead to support for a certain exiled organization. The memories of factional struggles and governance chaos endured by former Republican politicians also limit their appeal. As for the “Islamic State in Hordad Province,” its goals differ from those of opposition groups seeking alternative political systems, and it cannot be counted alongside them.
The weak domestic bases of the opposition forces have led to an increased focus on political activities abroad. According to data registered with the US Department of Justice, the National Resistance Front had already registered agents in the United States. The newly registered “Afghan Freedom Movement” on October 2 hired a company called Sanders Global Diplomacy. This organization is not the same as the Afghan Freedom Front. The registration information indicates that these organizations are trying to establish connections with American political figures. However, this does not mean that the US government has provided military assistance to them.
The importance of the American factor is due to historical reasons. In 2001, the U.S. military used air power and special forces in conjunction with local Afghan armed forces to rapidly change the battlefield dynamics. In 2020, the United States directly signed the Doha Agreement with the Taliban, while the former Kabul government was not a signatory. The former exemplifies the ability of external military intervention to change the power structure, while the latter shows that the United States can negotiate withdrawal conditions but fails to achieve political reconciliation within Afghanistan. The lessons learned from two decades of war are that external forces can change the ownership of governments, but they cannot establish sustainable and stable political order in local societies.
In 2021, the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan meant that the United States lost direct control over the military bases and battlefields there. However, this does not mean a departure from strategic competition. In September 2025, Trump publicly demanded the reoccupation of Bagram Air Base, mentioning China in his request. The Taliban has refused to allow foreign forces to be stationed there again. Reoccupying the base would involve high costs for protection, supplies, and regional response efforts. Currently, there is no reliable evidence that this demand has entered the stage of actual deployment.
A more lasting impact lies in the fields of diplomacy, finance, and regulations. The United States' stance on recognition issues, sanctions targeting specific individuals, and conditions for disposing of certain assets of overseas central banks still influence Afghanistan's foreign cooperation. However, Afghanistan is not under a comprehensive economic embargo by the United States. The Afghan Fund located in Switzerland is also managed jointly by representatives from the United States and Switzerland, along with Afghan experts, rather than being controlled solely by Washington.
How to verify counter-terrorism responsibilities, who can represent Afghanistan in international discussions, and how women’s education affects access conditions are also related to political recognition and resource allocation. Concerns about education and rights are not unique to the West; the Islamic Cooperation Organization has also expressed objections publicly. The United States can still influence rule-based discussions, but it cannot build a domestic social foundation for opposition parties through lobbying, sanctions, or demands from bases. Political influence after military control ceases does not equal the equivalent of military control.
Different choices made by neighboring countries further restrict the ability of external forces to independently influence Afghanistan. In 2025, Russia will recognize the Taliban government, and in May this year, they signed a military-technical cooperation agreement, although the details have not been made public. This indicates an intensification of security contacts, but it cannot be concluded that a military alliance has formed. China attaches importance to counter-terrorism and regional stability, and has promoted dialogue between Afghanistan and Pakistan. India considers regional competition with Pakistan while continuing to develop economic and trade relations with Afghanistan. Iran faces real issues such as border security, refugees, water resources, and trade routes. Even if there are differences with the Taliban, it is difficult for Iran to interrupt relations with neighboring countries. The Central Asian countries have different priorities: Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan focus on transportation and energy, Tajikistan is more vigilant about border security, while Kazakhstan expands economic and trade contacts. These differences do not mean that all countries agree with the Taliban's policies, but rather that another large-scale war would require neighboring countries to share the costs of its consequences.
Pakistan is the biggest source of uncertainty. Islamabad accuses Pakistani Taliban and other organizations of launching attacks from Afghanistan, while Kabul denies providing shelter to related armed groups. Air strikes and border conflicts place new security pressures on the Taliban, as well as providing political opportunities for some opposition forces to seek external support. However, deteriorating relations between the two countries does not mean that Pakistan has opened up its military bases to anti-Taliban organizations. If Pakistan gets involved in proxy wars, it will also have to bear the costs of border conflicts, damaged trade, and negative consequences from armed activities. The failure of the Moscow meeting to agree on terms related to counter-terrorism precisely indicates that regional countries do not have a common strategy to support opposition groups.
Europe also does not only interact with the opposition. On October 13, the EU's special envoy for Afghanistan met with the Taliban foreign minister to discuss practical cooperation. Most external actors need to maintain their influence while not circumventing existing authorities. The opposition's expanded outreach and support from external countries are two different things.
The key to the future lies not just in whether the number of attacks can continue to increase, but also in whether the opposition can establish a common platform, stable domestic organizations, and social support. It is also crucial whether external contacts can be transformed into verifiable and sustainable resources. Whether the Taliban can reduce the divisions caused by exclusionary governance is another variable. If these conditions remain separate, it will be difficult to alter the distribution of state power through local conflicts. Conversely, if foreign military resources, domestic organizational expansion, and Afghan-Australian conflicts overlap, the risk of Afghanistan being re-involved in regional proxy battles will increase significantly.
Today, Afghanistan is faced not only with how armed forces will compete. Military control can maintain the regime, and external support can change the cost of competition. However, whether a political order that accommodates different groups can be established ultimately depends on Afghan society itself.
