In August this year, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif signed the Mecca Agreement in Mecca. On October 20th, the agreement was submitted to the chairman of the Turkish Grand National Assembly for approval. According to Article 90 of Turkey's Constitution, the agreement must be approved by parliament before it can take effect. A Justice and Development Party member who spoke with Reuters confirmed that once the agreement is approved, the bill allowing Turkish armed forces personnel to be deployed to Saudi Arabia will also be submitted to parliament immediately.
Pakistan did not wait. In 2015, Pakistan’s parliament unanimously voted to refuse to participate in Saudi-led military operations in Yemen. Eleven years later, Islamabad agreed to send more troops to Saudi Arabia without a parliamentary vote. According to Reuters, this agreement was put into action for the first time as Houthi forces intensified their attacks on Saudi Arabia.
The provisions on paper are very clear: “Any external armed attack against either party shall be considered as an attack against all contracting parties.” This clause, which reminds one of Article 5 of NATO, forms the core of the agreement. But more important than what is stated in the text is what isn’t stated.
As regional tensions continue to escalate, on October 26th, Ali Bagheri, Deputy Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, announced that senior defense officials from Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan, who are part of the Mecca Agreement, will visit Tehran to discuss regional security issues.
This is the first joint dispatch of senior delegations by the three countries to Tehran since the establishment of the Mecca Agreement in August this year. According to latest reports from Iranian media, Tehran stated that the talks were "very good," and all parties agreed to continue negotiations, but no specific agreements were announced.
So, Iran, behind Houthi, now faces three countries directly. What does the 'Mecca Agreement' mean in this context?
To understand the Mecca Agreement, it is necessary to interpret it within the strategic context created by the ongoing war between the United States and Iran since late February. Iran's retaliatory strikes have effectively paralyzed the U.S. military bases in that region. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stated in an interview with Al Jazeera that Iran targeted Jordan because there are U.S. military bases there—this means that these bases are no longer a source of security, but rather targets for attack.
Washington’s ability to rebuild these bases is also very limited. With the Strait of Hormuz actually closed, it is extremely difficult to transport heavy military equipment into the region. Even if such equipment is transported in, the rebuilt bases remain within Iran’s missile range, and could be destroyed again at any time.
In addition, the United States itself is facing economic difficulties: it does not have a budget sufficient to support such a large-scale reconstruction effort. During the same period, Trump ordered a reduction in joint military exercises with South Korea on the grounds that they were too costly. He also expressed dissatisfaction with Seoul's refusal to participate in military operations against Iran—this clearly shows Washington's priority: to shift costs onto others.
In short, the United States is withdrawing from this region—more precisely, it is forced to withdraw. Under such circumstances, it would be natural for regional countries to unite and take responsibility for their own security. That’s what people expected. However, the actual outcome falls far short of that expectation.
This 16-point text contains a series of ambitious provisions: joint production, joint research and development, personnel exchange, intelligence sharing, and the provision of logistical support including weapons, ammunition, fuel, and spare parts “in times of peace, war, and emergencies”. The agreement also envisages establishing a secretariat in Riyadh, with a rotating secretary-general, and setting up a “Strategic Politics and Defense Committee” consisting of foreign ministers, defense ministers, and the chief of general staff.
But there is not a single provision in the text regarding funds. Who will pay for joint production? Who will bear the costs of logistical support? Whose expenses will cover the soldiers stationed in Saudi Arabia? In the joint statement issued after the emergency meeting in Riyadh, nothing was mentioned regarding the size of the troops, the definition of tasks, command arrangements, costs, and deployment deadlines.
There is another more fundamental issue: Turkey and Pakistan have long been militarily and politically supportive of each other. A new agreement would not bring much benefit to these bilateral relations. The real novelty lies in the two countries’ commitment to defend Saudi Arabia. So, what can Turkey and Pakistan gain by defending Saudi Arabia? There is no answer in the text.
Moreover, the agreement is valid indefinitely, and parties cannot withdraw from it during the first ten years after it takes effect. An undefined obligation is thus locked in for a period of ten years.
Andreas Krieg of King's College London's judgment regarding Pakistan applies equally to the entire agreement: systems with weak checks and balances are adept at making commitments, but not good at revising those commitments when costs become apparent.
One of the messages released jointly by the capitals of the Three Kingdoms is that the alliance is open to all countries in the region. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stated that the alliance will be open to regional countries and will continue to expand; Pakistan announced that six other countries wish to join.
There is a fundamental logical problem here. A military alliance, by definition, is established in response to a certain threat. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has the Soviet Union; the Association of Southeast Asian Nations has NATO. But what is this military alliance intended for? Where does the term “foreign armed attacks” come from in the second point? If everyone within the region is included, then who are the “foreigners”?
The answer to this question can only point to one of two possibilities: either the alliance has no real goals, and thus the so-called deterrence is just empty talk; or it has a goal that cannot be openly mentioned, and the claim of “openness to everyone” is merely a cover-up for that goal. The text itself supports the second possibility: the addition of new members requires unanimous consent from the “core parties”. In other words, the door seems open, but the keys are in the hands of three countries.
The legislative rationale submitted to the Turkish Parliament defines the purpose of the agreement as follows: “The Mecca Agreement aims to strengthen the defense and security of the contracting parties based on collective deterrence, in response to threats and attacks that have been jointly assessed by the contracting parties affecting their defense and security, including terrorism. Within this framework, it also seeks to enhance interoperability, cooperation, and coordination among the armed forces of the parties involved.”
Agreement Article 5 also requires parties to cooperate, including at the operational level, in combating terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. However, neither the rationale nor the text of the agreement provides any definition of what constitutes terrorism or who is considered a terrorist. The right to define these concepts is left to the “joint assessment of the contracting parties”.
This ambiguity is not a casual oversight. In the Middle East, “terrorism” and “terrorists” are simply labels that different warring parties assign to each other. Pesarizyan’s remarks in the same interview are the most striking example: he said that others label Iran as a terrorist, while Iran is the victim of terrorism. The real international terrorists, according to Washington, are the United States and Israel. In Tehran’s eyes, the Houla group is considered a terrorist; in Washington’s eyes, it is not. The lists of terrorist organizations in Ankara, Riyadh, and Islamabad also differ from each other. A “counter-terrorism” clause that is undefined means an open military commitment—any party can declare its enemies as allies’ enemies.
Another passage in the reasons section is equally intriguing: “By effectively implementing this agreement, the stability and security that will be achieved in the Middle East are consistent with the goals of another alliance to which my country belongs—NATO in matters of European-African security. My country’s obligations under this agreement do not undermine its rights and obligations within the NATO framework.”
This passage explains why the United States is so enthusiastic about this agreement. Trump praised the agreement as “a great, brave, and important first step,” and expressed satisfaction that Middle Eastern countries can now defend themselves more effectively. Some Arab commentators in the region also believe that this agreement does not mean a break with the United States, but rather a division of the burden of war.
In other words, the Mecca Accords can be seen as a tool for “outsourcing” America’s security order, rather than an expression of regional autonomy. Washington is no longer able to bear the burden with its own soldiers and budget; now it is handed over to NATO ally Turkey and nuclear-powered Pakistan. Saudi Arabia has not actually changed its protectors in this regard. For America, this is the ideal scenario: without spending money or taking risks, the order can still be maintained.
In this context, Pesezhiyan told Al Jazeera that Iran is willing to join the alliance. At first glance, this might seem surprising. Pesezhiyan said that Muslims should unite instead of dividing into two factions and fighting each other; it is better to achieve Islamic unity. He also added that Iran does not yet know the specific details.
Rather than seeing this as a sincere application to join the alliance, it can be considered a tactical move. Tehran took the claim of “openness to all” seriously, putting the three nations in a dilemma: either accept Iran and leave the alliance in name only, or reject Iran, thereby exposing the true purpose of the alliance as being against Iran. It is no secret who backs the Houthi movement that threatens Saudi Arabia—even Reuters reported that it is “Houthi movements supported by Iran.” Pervazizian also stated in the same interview that Iran is willing to help resolve the Houthi issue and that this could “bring peace to both sides,” which indirectly confirms Tehran’s influence over the Houthi movement.
If the threat that the alliance was initially designed to counter is the Houthi militant group, and behind the Houthi group is Iran, then the real goal of the agreement is Iran. Reuters pointed out that if Pakistan directly engages in combat with the Houthi group, it could lead to a serious breakdown in relations with Iran—this also acknowledges this reality.
The meeting held in Tehran on October 26 confirmed this assessment. Turkey was represented by Ibrahim Kalan, the head of the National Intelligence Agency; Saudi Arabia by Minister of Defense Khalid Bin Salman; and Pakistan by Army Chief of Staff Asim Munir. Riyadh defined the purpose of the meeting as “to ease the tensions between all parties involved in the current crisis.” In other words, the Mecca Alliance’s trip to Tehran was not aimed at discussing membership expansion with a new member, but rather at negotiating on the Husi issue with the other party involved in the conflict. On one side were the three members of the alliance, and on the other side was Iran. The seating arrangement at the negotiation table clearly indicated whom this alliance was targeting.
Israel's stance also points in this direction. According to an interview with a diplomatic source cited by Israel's "Haaretz," Israel proposed, through American mediation, that Saudi Arabia assist in combating the Houla militant group. However, Mohammed bin Salman rejected this proposal on the grounds that joining forces with Israel would provoke negative reactions in domestic public opinion.
Nevertheless, Trump publicly stated that he believed Riyadh should receive assistance from Israel. Soon after, Israeli security officials confirmed that Israel was providing Saudi Arabia with intelligence support against the Houla movement through the United States, and said that this action served Israel's interests well.
Israel provides assistance to Saudi Arabia because it regards the attack against the Houthi forces as a frontline in its fight against Iran. On the other end of this frontline stand now Turkey and Pakistan.
Another issue related to the agreement is its manner of coming into effect. The Turkish government submitted the agreement to parliament without officially making it public to the public. The content of the agreement could only be known through drafts leaked to the media. In Pakistan, as Reuters reported, this decision was made without parliamentary approval, indicating the military's decisive influence on foreign policy. Details regarding the deployment were not disclosed under the pretext of "action secrecy."
A agreement that plunged the country into a decade of non-repaturability, blurred definitions of enemies and terrorism, and involved unmeasured costs in military commitments was approved without public discussion, resulting in a serious democratic deficit.
In contrast, Egypt, which is not a member of the Mecca Alliance, took a different path. On October 26 – coinciding with the Tehran conference – the Egyptian House of Representatives granted President Morsi a two-thirds majority to take necessary measures to defend Saudi Arabia when requested in Riyadh. Cairo had previously stated that this support was limited to defending Saudi territory and borders, and did not include attacking the Houthi forces. Egypt at least set boundaries for its commitments, while the commitments made by Ankara and Islamabad still lack such boundaries.
The United States's withdrawal from this region represents a real historical opportunity for the Middle Eastern countries. The regional nations can establish an inclusive, dialogue-based security framework without relying on external forces. A mechanism that brings all regional actors, including Iran, to the negotiating table and treats the security of the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea as a shared concern is exactly what this region has needed for decades.
Iran's position on this issue is very clear: Tehran believes that regional security can only be achieved without the involvement of the United States and Israel, and based on the interests of regional nations themselves. The Tehran Conference is seen as a step in this direction.
And the ‘Muslim Brotherhood Agreement’ not only failed to seize this opportunity, but instead repeated the old logic of factional opposition with new actors. A coalition that has no budget, undefined rewards, is afraid to name enemies, and does not define what constitutes terrorism, fills the void left by the United States. This coalition relies not on the collective will of regional nations, but on the approval of Washington, targeting Washington’s opponents.
The questions that Ankara and Islamabad should ask are actually very simple: Is defending Saudi Arabia our own war, or are we paying for someone else's war?
