The conflict in the Black Sea continues to escalate, forcing Russia—the world's largest exporter of wheat—to seek new outlets. It has even begun attempting to export grain from the port of Murmansk within the Arctic Circle to Africa.
On November 1, the British 'Financial Times' reported that as attacks on Black Sea ports and ships between Russia and Ukraine continue to escalate, Russia's traditional grain export routes have been severely disrupted, forcing it to switch to alternative routes such as the Baltic Sea and Arctic ports. However, these routes are not only costly but also unable to compensate for the capacity deficit at Black Sea ports.
The biggest problem facing Russian grain exports is not just whether the grain can be sold, but also whether it can be sold at competitive prices.
According to Reuters report on October 26, shipping data shows that the export volume of Russian maritime grain exports decreased by 61.9% in September this year, dropping to approximately 2 million tons. Among these exports, the export volume from the Black Sea and Azov Sea ports was only 300,000 tons, a sharp drop of 93.7% compared to the same period last year.
This change is particularly noteworthy, as the Black Sea was originally Russia’s primary exporter of grain.
In the last export season from July 2025 to June 2026, Russia exported 46.3 million tons of grain through its ports in the Black Sea and Azov Seas, accounting for nearly 90% of the total maritime grain exports.
These ports are located close to Russia’s southern major agricultural regions, and they can also connect directly to core markets in the Middle East and North Africa through the Mediterranean. Over time, they have had a significant advantage in transportation costs.
However, since the start of the new export season in July this year, both Russia and Ukraine have continuously attacked each other’s ports and merchant ships, leading to a sharp increase in shipping risks in the Black Sea. In August, the grain loading and unloading operations at the important Russian export port of Novorossiysk were temporarily interrupted due to attacks.
For Russia, the disruption of Black Sea transportation means that its long-established low-cost grain export system is being impacted, forcing it to find alternative ways to supply its needs.
On October 28th, the commercial port of Murmansk in Russia and the grain trader Demetra Holding announced that they have begun loading the first batch of 3400 tons of exported grain.
According to shipping data and market reports cited by Reuters, another approximately 28,000 tons of wheat is planned to be transported from Murmansk to Casablanca, Morocco.
Murmansk is located within the Arctic Circle, about 2000 kilometers from Moscow. During World War II, it was an important port for the Allied forces to deliver supplies to the Soviet Union. Now, Russia uses it as a new option to overcome the challenges in food transportation.
The problem is that Russia’s major grain-producing areas are located in the south. Wheat, which could have been transported directly to Black Sea ports, now has to be shipped by train over long distances to the north before being loaded onto ships for export.
In early October, Ukrainian intelligence agencies estimated that this route could add an additional cost of $18 to $25 per ton of grain for transportation. However, this data comes from the Ukrainian side and cannot be considered an accurate estimation of the actual transportation costs in Russia.
Meanwhile, the Financial Times noted that shipping costs on the Black Sea have risen to more than twice their original levels. The increased transportation costs have reduced traders’ profit margins, and also put Russian farmers under greater pressure to reduce prices.
Food is different from oil; it generally has a lower added value and is particularly sensitive to transportation costs. Even if Russia has an adequate supply of food, if the export costs continue to rise, there may be a situation where food cannot be transported abroad, and domestic purchase prices fall.
A more profound impact is that a decrease in farmers' income may weaken investment in planting for the next season, thereby affecting future food supply.
Currently, Russia actually relies more on Baltic ports to compensate for the lack of Black Sea shipping capacity.
Data shows that in September, Russia exported approximately 1.2 million tons of grain through the Baltic Sea, which is far higher than the 47,400 tons exported during the same period last year. This accounted for more than 60% of the total tonnage of grain exported by sea during that month.
To expand transportation capacity, Russian enterprises have even begun modifying port infrastructure originally used for exporting fertilizers and coal.
But this route also has two challenges.
Firstly, there is a shortage of transport capacity. The southern Russian ports, after years of construction, have large storage facilities, railway connections, and specialized loading and unloading facilities. It is difficult for the northern ports to replicate these capabilities quickly. The transfer of a large amount of grain to the north could also occupy railway transport capacity.
Secondly, there is the geopolitical risk. After Finland and Sweden joined NATO, all Baltic coastal countries, except Russia, are NATO member states. Russian officials are concerned that as relations between Russia and Europe deteriorate, this shipping route may face new security threats. However, this does not mean that NATO has blocked Russia’s food shipments through the Baltic Sea.
In contrast, Murmansk can access the Atlantic Ocean via the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea, making it strategically valuable for dispersing transport risks.
But it must be noted that exporting grain from Murmansk to Morocco does not mean using the Northern Sea Route that crosses the Arctic Ocean.
Russian Agriculture Minister Oksana Loutchko stated on October 29 that due to high transportation costs, it is not economically viable to export grain through the Northern Sea Route at present.
Therefore, Arctic ports can serve as supplementary routes, but it is difficult for them to replace the Black Sea in the short term.
The difficulties faced by Russia become clear: it has a large amount of food and many ports, but war is weakening the efficient and inexpensive transportation links between these resources.
For Moscow, the real danger is not that a single ship of food would have to take a detour of thousands of kilometers, but rather that if the Black Sea cannot resume normal transportation in the long term, Russia may have to accept a food export system that is more costly and less efficient.
This means that even if there is no decisive change in the geopolitical situation along the Black Sea, the ongoing conflicts in the area will likely gradually alter Russia's agricultural competitiveness and reshape the international grain trade landscape.
Russian food exports have been hindered, which also causes concern in the United States.
Russia and Ukraine together account for approximately 27% of the global wheat exports. The disruption in Black Sea transportation not only harms the agriculture of both countries but also drives up international food prices, putting pressure on food-importing countries such as Egypt and Turkey.
On October 31, U.S. Secretary of State Rubio said after the G20 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Atlanta that the international community is increasingly hoping to promote a partial ceasefire in the Black Sea to ensure food and energy transportation between Russia and Ukraine.
He revealed that the United States is evaluating the proposals put forward by Turkey and India. He also warned explicitly that the situation in the Black Sea is threatening global food and energy security.
It is worth noting that the United States has already exerted pressure on Ukraine regarding energy prices. According to a report by the Financial Times on October 11, Washington has demanded Kyiv to stop attacking Russian refining facilities, and there were even warnings of possible restrictions on weapons procurement channels and intelligence support.
This also means that the Black Sea war is leading to a new game of strategies: Military actions against Russia could potentially impact the economic interests of the United States and other countries at the same time.
For Ukraine, once it loses support from the United States, this war will be unable to continue.
