The war launched by the United States against Iran has not only severely damaged the global supply chain and disrupted markets for energy and key resources, but it has also brought water securitya long-standing issue that is often overlookedinto the spotlight.
According to a report by the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post on May 28th, over the past three months, several desalination facilities in Iran, Bahrain, and Kuwait have been bombed. This has exposed the vulnerability of water resources in these regions, thereby raising alarms in neighboring Central Asia. Faced with an increasingly severe water shortage crisis, Central Asian countries may seek further support from China to modernize their irrigation systems and manage shared rivers within their region.
Unlike Gulf countries that rely on seawater for desalination, the five Central Asian countries depend on the meltwater from the Tianshan glaciers for their water supply. Approximately 80% of the water in these regions comes from these glaciers.
Oleg Abdurashitov, the chief policy advisor at Outpost Eurasia, an independent public affairs consulting firm based in Dubai, said that Central Asia faces similar problems to those faced by Iran. Due to factors such as climate change, population growth, and accelerated urbanization, water resources are in a state of chronic shortage in Central Asia.
During the Soviet era, Uzbekistan attempted to develop its cotton industry, which was known as white gold. As a result, many rivers were artificially diverted for irrigation purposes. The direct consequence was that the Aral Sea, once one of the worlds largest inland lakes, almost disappeared. The original lakebed became a toxic desert due to the long-term accumulation of pesticide residues.
After the independence of five Central Asian countries in 1991, conflicts over water resources distribution intensified rapidly. This situation was particularly acute between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which are located in the upstream region, and Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, which are located in the downstream region. In 2012, Tajikistan planned to build the Rogun Dam on an important tributary of the Amu River. As a result, Uzbekistan took measures such as cutting off its natural gas supply to Tajikistan, which nearly brought the Tajik economy to a halt.
The Fergana Basin, divided among Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, has long been a focal point of regional conflicts. The canals built during the Soviet era crossed the borders of these three countries, making water resource management particularly complex and sensitive. In 2021, surveillance cameras installed by Tajikistan at border water supply facilities were damaged by Kyrgyzstans citizens. This led to armed conflicts between the two sides, resulting in at least 55 deaths and forcing over 30,000 people to evacuate.
Whats worse is that the numerous water conservancy facilities built during the Soviet era have fallen into disrepair over time. Additionally, climate change has led to a continuous shrinkage of the glaciers in the Tianshan Mountains. Recent studies conducted in Switzerland and Belgium predict that by 2040, the amount of ice in the Tianshan glaciers will be reduced by about one-third compared to 2020. By 2100, the amount of ice could decrease by 69% to 93%.
Kazakhstan experiences drought during the summer months, often leading to shortages of water resources. Information from the Kazakh government website.
Jessica Neafie, assistant professor of political science and international relations at Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan, pointed out that Middle Eastern wars could serve as a warning bell for Central Asian countries to reconsider the risks associated with water security. Although conflicts in Iran will not completely change Central Asian water policies, they highlight the vulnerability of critical infrastructure during geopolitical conflicts. For example, parts of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan located along the Caspian Sea have begun relying on desalination systems for their water needs.
Due to traditional freshwater resources being either over-exploited or located in remote areas, these countries are expanding the construction of desalination facilities. This means that they are developing water supply systems that rely heavily on infrastructure, similar to those found in Bahrain and Iran, she said.
Nife believes that, given the intertwined issues of food security, energy planning, and global competition, this will further encourage decision-makers in Central Asia to pay more attention to water security. Central Asian countries may increasingly seek investment from China to enhance their water security capabilities.
In fact, China has been continuously strengthening its cooperation with Central Asian countries in terms of water resources in recent years. At the first China-Central Asia Summit in 2023, China clearly stated its willingness to cooperate with Central Asian countries in areas such as the management and development of saline-alkali land, and the use of water-saving irrigation methods. Both sides also agreed to establish joint agricultural laboratories in arid regions, thereby contributing to addressing the ecological crisis in the Aral Sea. After the second Summit last year, a joint statement once again mentioned cooperation in areas such as water-saving technologies, desertification control, and the management and development of saline-alkali land.
Currently, Chinese companies are actively involved in the construction of infrastructure in Central Asia, especially in the fields of renewable energy and hydropower. Chinese enterprises have not only undertaken large-scale hydropower projects in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, but they have also participated in the upgrading and renovation of numerous small and medium-sized hydropower stations. The China Export-Import Bank has provided loans for the repair project of irrigation channels in Uzbekistan, with Chinese contractors directly involved in the construction work.
Central Asian officials also frequently visit Chinese water-saving technology companies. Since 2024, Chinas PowerChina has funded and trained 325 professionals in water resource management from Kazakhstan.
Last year, China signed its first memorandum of understanding on water resources cooperation with Kazakhstan, which shares 25 cross-border rivers. Nurlan Nurijitov, the Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation in Kazakhstan, praised this agreement as being instrumental in making more effective use of water resources. It also encouraged the adoption of advanced water conservation and metering technologies, as well as the training of professionals in related fields.
According to Nifes analysis, Central Asian countries may regard China as a key participant in ensuring water security in the future, as China can provide technology, engineering expertise, and funding.
As the war in Iran makes water security issues even more urgent, Central Asian countries are seeking to strengthen their defenses. The existing relations between the two sides may further develop. In particular, if Central Asian countries expand their desalination projects along the Caspian Sea, Chinese companies can play a role in financing, construction, and digital management systems. she said.
However, according to Nifes analysis, the water crisis in Central Asia is essentially a cross-border issue. This means that cooperation with China cannot replace more effective coordination among the five governments in the region.
Positive progress has been made. In March last year, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan announced that all territorial disputes between the three countries had been resolved. Seven months later, the first Water Resources Management Committees of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan met in Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan. According to reports from the Kazakh International News Agency, the meeting discussed ways to attract investment in order to upgrade important cross-border water infrastructure facilities.
After decades of tense relations and periodic conflicts, the five Central Asian countries reached an agreement last year regarding the allocation of water resources from the Amu River and Syr Darya during the non-growing season from 2025 to 2026. Specific quotas were established for each country, ensuring that minimum flows are maintained at key hydrological points and in the Tarim Delta.
However, this balance may be disrupted. After the Afghan Taliban took power in 2021, they began to construct the Kuchtpa Canal. The Afghan Taliban is not a member of any regional mechanisms in Central Asia. If their plans are realized, this canal could potentially reduce one-third of the flow of the Amu River, which supplies water to Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan.
Yang Shu, Director of the Central Asia Research Institute at Lanzhou University, said that for governments in Central Asia, the key goal is to address issues related to water resource allocation. Although they cooperate with China, China cannot get involved in the core issues related to water resource allocation.
